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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Rex F. Rammell appeals from the district court's intermediate appellate 
decision affirming his conviction for possessing unlawfully taken game. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In August 2010, the Idaho Department of Fish and Game issued Rammel! 
a tag to hunt elk in Idaho's Middle Fork elk management zone during the 2010 
elk hunting season. (State's Exhibits 1 and 2.) The tag stated on its face that it 
was a "Res Middle Fork Elk A" tag and was "Valid In Unit(s): 20A-26-27." 
(State's Exhibit 2 (capitalization altered).) 
The hunting season for "Elk A" tag holders in the Middle Fork Zone closed 
on October 31, 2010. (Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.2.) Nearly one month later, on 
November 30,2010, Rammell killed a cow elk in Unit 69 of the Tex Creek Zone-
an elk management zone that is between 150 to 200 miles away from the Middle 
Fork Zone in which Rammell's tag had been valid. (Tr., p.3, Ls.21-24, p.7, LsA-
20, p.8, Ls.6-20, p.14, Ls.9-10, p.90, Ls.8-13, p.100, Ls.15-24, p.103, L.23 -
p.104, L.3, p.105, Ls.11-18; see also State's Exhibit 1.) Fish and Game Officer 
Dan Kelsey encountered Rammel! as he was leaving the Tex Creek Zone with 
the elk. (Tr., p.7, LA - p.8, L.5.) Rammel! told the officer that he had killed the 
elk "over by the hay sheds near the corrals," an area the officer recognized to be 
in the Tex Creek Zone and not "anywhere near the Middle Fork Zone." (Tr., p.8, 
Ls.8-20, p.11, Ls.5-12.) At Officer Kelsey's request, Rammell produced both his 
hunting license and his elk tag. (Tr., p.11, L.13 - p.12, L.16, p.14, Ls.11-15, 
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pA7, Ls.20-22.) Upon inspecting the tag, Officer Kelsey noted that it was only 
valid in the Middle Fork Zone, and he advised Rammell of that fact. (Tr., p.13, 
Ls.6-16, pA7, L.23 - pA8, L.1.) Rammell told the officer "he had been to the 
Middle Fork, but there were no elk there." (Tr., p.14, Ls.16-20; see also Tr., 
p.95, LS.15-25 (Rammell told a second Fish and Game officer in a subsequent 
conversation that he "had to come over [to the Tex Creek Zone] to hunt, 
[because] there's nothing in the Middle Fork except for wolves.").) Officer Kelsey 
told Rammel! he was going to seize the elk and a series of heated discussions 
ensued, culminating in Rammell telling the officer, "I might have to shoot you if 
you try and take this elk." (Tr., p.55, LA - p.57, L.3, p.57, L.22 - p.58, L.25, 
p.62, L.24 - p.70, L.2, p.82, L.22 - p.83, L.5.) 
Later in the day, a second Fish and Game officer seized the elk from 
Rammell's residence. (Tr., p.87, Ls.12-18, p.88, L.18 - p.92, L.7.) DNA 
comparisons of tissue from both the elk and a "gut pile" located near the hay 
sheds and corral to which Rammell had referred confirmed that Rammel! killed 
the elk in Tex Creek Zone. (Tr., p.10, L.15 - p.11, LA, p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.25, 
p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.23, p.100, Ls.15-24, p.1 03, L.23 - p.1 05, L.18.) 
The state charged Rammell with possessing unlawfully taken game, in 
violation of I.C. § 36-502(b). (R., Vol. 1, pp.11-12, 57-59.) Before trial, the state 
moved in limine to prohibit Rammell from introducing any evidence concerning 
his intent or lack thereof to violate the law. (R., Vol. 1, pp.36-40.) The 
magistrate granted the motion, reasoning that, because possession of unlawfully 
taken wildlife is a general intent crime, any evidence tending to establish that 
2 
Rammell did not know the elk he possessed was taken illegally was not relevant. 
(R, Vol. 1, pp.43-44, 63-64, 163-70.) For the same reason, the magistrate 
denied Rammell's request to instruct the jury on the defense of misfortune or 
mistake of fact. (R., Vol. 1, pp.122-33, 163-70; see also R, Vol. 1, pp.172-91 
(final jury instructions).) The court also declined Rammell's requests to instruct 
the jury that the "IDAHO BIG GAME SEASONS AND RULES 2010" brochure, 
published by the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, constituted the law 
governing the taking of wildlife in Idaho. (R, Vol. 1, pp.68-71, 74-76, 126-29, 
166-69; see also R., pp.172-91 (final jury instructions).) 
Following a trial, a jury found Rammell guilty of possessing unlawfully 
taken game. (R., Vol. 1, p.192.) The magistrate entered judgment (R., Vol. 1, 
p.193) and Rammel! appealed to the district court (R., Vol. 1, pp.194-95), which 
affirmed (R., Vol. 2, pp.251-63). Rammell again appeals. (R., Vol. 2, pp.264-
68.) 
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ISSUES 
Rammell's issue statement is set forth at pages 8-10 of his Appellant's 
brief and, due to its length, is not repeated here. The state rephrases the issues 
on appeal as: 
1. Has Rammell failed to establish that the trial court abused its 
discretion by prohibiting Rammel! from introducing irrelevant 
evidence? 
2. Has Rammel! failed to show error in the jury instructions? 
3. Has Rammel! failed to show that the trial court lacked either subject 
matter or personal jurisdiction? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Rammell Has Failed To Show That The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Prohibiting Him From Presenting Irrelevant Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Before trial, Rammell advised the court that he was proceeding on the 
theory that he lacked the criminal intent or criminal negligence necessary to 
sustain a conviction for possession of unlawfully taken game. (R., Vol. 1, p.123.) 
To support this defense, Rammell sought to admit into evidence a copy of the 
"IDAHO BIG GAME SEASONS AND RULES 2010" brochure published by the 
Idaho Department of Fish and Game (hereinafter "2010 Big Game Rules"). (R., 
Vol. 1, p.126; Tr., p.42, Ls.17-21; see also Defendant's Exhibit A. i ) The trial 
court declined to admit the 2010 Big Game Rules, ruling that, because 
possession of unlawfully taken game is a general intent crime, any evidence 
proffered by Rammell to show that he lacked a specific intent to commit the 
crime was irrelevant. (R., Vol. 1, pp.43-44, 63-64, 163-70; Tr., p.43, Ls.14-21.) 
Rammell challenges the trial court's ruling, arguing as he did below that a 
conviction under the possession of unlawfully taken game statute requires proof 
of a specific criminal intent. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-21, 24-29.) Rammell's 
1 Defendant's Exhibit A is a copy of the 2010 Big Game Rules. The exhibit was 
marked for identification purposes, but the trial court ultimately declined to admit 
it into evidence. (Tr., p.21, Ls.3-23, p.42, L.17 - p.43, L.21.) To the extent the 
reporter's transcript indicates the exhibit was admitted, such is an obvious error. 
(Compare Tr., p.4 (exhibit list indicating Defendant's Exhibit A was admitted) and 
p.22, LS.8-9 (same) with p.23, Ls.13-15 (court instructing witness not to show 
Defendant's Exhibit A to jury because "[i]t's not introduced into evidence) and 
p.42, L.17 - p.43, L.21 (court denying Rammell's motion to admit Defendant's 
Exhibit A).) 
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argument is without merit. Both the trial court and the district court on appeal 
correctly determined that possession of unlawfully taken game is a general intent 
crime and, as such, evidence that Rammell did not intend to violate the law was 
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. Rammell has failed to establish an abuse 
of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kl 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." kl (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981 )). 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of that discretion. 
State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971,974,829 P.2d 861,864 (1992). 
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C. The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Declining To Admit 
The 2010 Big Game Rules For The Proffered Purpose Of Negating 
Rammell's Intent 
Rammell shot and killed an elk in an elk management zone other than 
that for which he had a valid tag. The state charged him with possessing 
unlawfully taken game in violation of I.C. § 36-502(b), which provides: 
Unlawful Possession. No person shall have in his 
possession any wildlife or parts thereof protected by the provisions 
of this title and the taking or killing of which is unlawful. 
Pursuant to IDAPA 13.01.08.255.01, an "Elk Zone A Tag is valid for specified A 
Tag elk seasons within a specified zone only." 
Rammell concedes on appeal that his 2010 Middle Fork Elk A tag (see 
State's Exhibit 2) was not valid in the Tex Creek Zone (Appellant's brief, p.17). 
He argues, however, that to be guilty of violating I.C. § 36-502(b), he must have 
had the specific intent to violate the law - i.e., he must have known that the elk 
he possessed was taken illegally. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-21.) Rammell argues 
that the 2010 Big Game Rules upon which he purportedly relied to ascertain the 
law relative to his hunting rights do not clearly state that an elk tag is valid in only 
one zone and, as such, were relevant and admissible to show that he lacked any 
criminal intent. (Appellant's brief, pp.12, 19, 24-29.) Rammell is incorrect. 
"Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible." State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 
926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993) (citing I.R.E. 402). Even assuming the 2010 Big 
Game Rules support RammeWs claim that he lacked knowledge that the elk he 
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possessed was taken illegally,2 the rules were not relevant in Rammell's 
prosecution because a conviction for possession of unlawfully taken game under 
LC. § 36-502(b) does not require proof of any specific criminal intent. 
It is well settled that "[t]he mental state that is required for the commission 
of a particular offense is determined by the language of the statute defining that 
offense." State v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352, 354, 145 P.3d 917, 919 (Ct. App. 
2006) (citing State v. Broadhead, 139 Idaho 663, 666, 84 P.3d 599, 602 (Ct. 
App. 2004)); see also Fox, 124 Idaho at 925, 866 P.2d at 182 (quoting State v. 
Sterrett, 35 Idaho 580, 583,201 P. 1071, 1072 (1922)) ('''[W]hether a criminal 
intent is a necessary element of a statutory offense is a matter of construction, to 
be determined from the language of the statute in view of its manifest purpose 
and design."'). '''[W]here such intent is not made an ingredient of the offense, 
the intention with which the act is done, or the lack of any criminal intent in the 
premises, is immateriaL'" Fox, 124 Idaho at 925-26,866 P.2d at 182-83 (quoting 
Sterrett, 35 Idaho at 583, 201 P. at 1072); accord State v. Prather, 135 Idaho 
770, 774, 25 P.3d 83, 87 (2001); Dolsby, 143 Idaho at 354, 145 P.3d at 919; 
State v. Simpson, 137 Idaho 813,816,54 P.3d 456, 459 (Ct. App. 2002). "'Error 
cannot be predicated upon the action of the court in excluding evidence tending 
to show the defendant's good intentions and good faith, where a criminal intent is 
2 The state does not concede that the 2010 Big Game Rules support Rammell's 
claim that he lacked knowledge that his Middle Fork tag was valid only in the 
Middle Fork Zone. Indeed, as set forth in greater detail in Section ILC., infra, the 
2010 Big Game Rules (and the tag itself) provided Rammell ample notice of the 
requirements of the law. 
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not a necessary element of the offense charged.'" Simpson, 137 Idaho at 816, 
54 P.3d at 469 (quoting Sterrett, 35 Idaho at 582-83,207 P. at 1072). 
In Simpson, the Idaho Court of Appeals specifically considered whether 
possession of unlawfully taken wildlife in violation of I.C. § 36-502(b) requires 
proof a criminal intent and concluded that it does not, explaining: "The statute is 
violated by the act of possession. It does not require that the perpetrator have 
knowledge that the wildlife was taken unlawfully." 137 Idaho at 817,54 P.3d at 
460. See also State v. Wimer, 118 Idaho 732, 800 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1990) 
(offense of taking an elk without a valid license, in violation of I.C. § 36-502, does 
not require proof of criminal intent). Thus, as with other regulatory offenses, "'the 
burden is placed upon the actor to ascertain at his peril whether his deed is 
within the prohibition of the statute.'" Simpson, 137 Idaho at 817,54 P.3d at 460 
(quoting Sterrett, 35 Idaho at 583, 207 P. at 1072 (intentional transportation of 
intoxicating liquor without legal authority unlawful notwithstanding any lack of 
criminal intent». 
Rammel! acknowledges the holdings of Simpson and Wimer but argues 
the cases were incorrectly decided in lig ht of Idaho Code §§ 18-114, 18-115 and 
18-201 which, he contends, require the state in every criminal prosecution to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant entertained a specific 
criminal intent. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-13, 21.) Rammell's argument is without 
merit. Idaho Code § 18-114 provides that "[i]n every crime or public offense 
there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal 
negligence." As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Fox, however, "the 
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intent required by I.C. § 18-114 is not the intent to commit a crime, but is merely 
the intent to knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence the 
failure to perform the required act." Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Because the statute under which 
Rammell was charged does not expressly set forth a mental state element, and 
because "I.C. § 18-114 only requires a general intent" (i.e., "a showing that the 
defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts"), Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 
866 P.2d at 183 (citations omitted), the state was not required to prove that 
Rammell entertained any specific criminal intent, only that he knowingly 
possessed an elk, the taking of which was unlawful. 
Idaho Code §§ 18-115 and 18-201 do not mandate a different result. 
Idaho Code § 18-115 states: "Intent or intention is manifested by the 
commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected with the 
offense." This statute merely clarifies that the intent required for any particular 
crime, be it specific or general, is manifested by the defendant's acts. See,~, 
Ex parte Seyfried, 74 Idaho 467, 470, 264 P.2d 685, 687 (1953) ("One's intent 
may be proved by his acts and conduct, and such is the usual and customary 
mode of proving intent."). It does not, as suggested by Rammell, impose upon 
the state the burden of proving a specific criminal intent when no such intent is 
required by the statute defining the offense. 
,Rammell's argument that proof of a specific criminal intent is required for 
a conviction for possessing unlawfully taken wildlife likewise finds no support in 
I.C. § 18-201. As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Fox, "Idaho Code § 18-
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201 provides a defense for '[p]ersons who committed the act or made the 
omission charged, under an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any 
criminal intent.'" Fox, 124 Idaho at 926,866 P.2d at 183 (quoting I.C. § 18-201). 
This statute merely provides a defense to crimes that require proof of a specific 
criminal intent. See,~, State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405, 406, 788 P.2d 220, 
221 (1990); Simpson, 137 Idaho 816-17,54 P.3d at 459-60. It does not require 
the state to prove criminal intent when the statute defining the offense contains 
no such element. Nor does the defense apply where, as here, the offense 
charged is a general intent crime. 3 ~, Simpson, 137 Idaho at 817,54 P.3d at 
460 (mistake of fact defense unavailable to defendant charged with possessing 
unlawfully taken elk because claimed mistake of fact, even if true, did not negate 
a mental element of the crime). 
As an alternative to his statutory-based arguments, Rammell appears to 
argue that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Staples v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), requires that in every crime there be an element of 
criminal intent or criminal negligence. (Appellant's brief, p.10, 18-19.) 
Rammell's reliance on Staples for this proposition is wholly misguided. 
3 Rammell argues that '''mistake of fact' is a defense" to a misdemeanor 
prosecution for possession of unlawfully taken wildlife and that, as such, he 
should have been permitted to present evidence relevant to and have the jury 
instructed on that defense. (Appellant's brief, p.16.) RammeWs argument fails 
because "mistake of fact" is not a defense to a general intent crime, see 
Simpson, 137 Idaho at 817, 54 P.3d at 460, and, as set forth in more detail in 
Section II.C., infra, the only evidence Rammell proffered in an attempt to support 
a "mistake of fact" defense established only that Rammell was ignorant of the 
law, not that he committed the acts charged through mistake, misfortune or 
accident, as contemplated by I.C. § 18-201. 
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Staples addressed whether a federal statute criminalizing the possession 
of an unregistered machinegun required proof that the defendant knew the 
weapon "had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of a 
machinegun." !9.:. at 602. The Court concluded, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, that it did, but it specifically noted that Congress "remains free to 
amend [the statute] by explicitly eliminating a mens rea requirement." !9.:. at 615 
n.11. Moreover, the Court found that the mens rea required under the statute 
was only that the defendant knew of the factual characteristics that brought the 
weapon within the statutory definitiori. !9.:. at 619. Expounding on this holding, 
Justice Ginsburg noted in her concurring opinion that the presumption that a 
mens rea attaches to the elements of an offense "requires knowledge only of the 
facts that make the defendant's conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related 
presumption, deeply rooted in the American legal system, that, ordinarily, 
ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution." 
!9.:. at 622 n.3 (Ginsburg J., concurring) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). In other words, the mens rea required is only general intent "requir[ing] 
a defendant to know the facts that make what he does illegal." United States v. 
Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2008) (interpreting Staples). Rammell's 
argument that Staples mandates in every criminal case an element of specific 
criminal intent is without merit. 
The trial court, and district court on appeal, correctly concluded that a 
conviction for possession of unlawfully taken game in violation of I.C. § 36-502(b) 
requires a showing of only general, not criminal, intent. ti, Simpson, 173 
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Idaho at 817,54 P.3d at 460. Because criminal intent was not an element of the 
crime, the 2010 Big Game Rules, proffered by Rammel! for the purpose of 
showing his lack of knowledge that the elk he possessed was taken unlawfully, 
were irrelevant. kL.; Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.3d at 183. Rammell has 
therefore failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 
admit the 2010 Big Game Rules into evidence. 
II. 
Rammel! Has Failed To Show Error In The Jury Instructions 
A. Introduction 
Rammel! contends that the trial court erred by declining to give his 
requested jury instruction on "mistake of fact." (Appellant's brief, pp.13-20.) He 
also contends that the court erred by instructing the jury on the statutory and 
IDAPA definitions of the crime without also instructing them on the rules set forth 
in the 2010 Big Game Rules. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-24.) Rammell's claims of 
instructional error are without merit. Rammell was not entitled to a "mistake of 
fact" instruction because "mistake of fact" is not a defense to a general intent 
crime and, in any event, the evidence Rammell proffered in an attempt to 
support a "mistake of fact" defense established only that Rammell was ignorant 
of the law, not that he committed the acts charged through mistake, misfortune 
or accident, as contemplated by I.C. § 18-201. Rammell was likewise not 
entitled to have the jury instructed on the 2010 Big Game Rules because the 
rules therein were adequately covered by other instructions given by the court. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district 
court in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section LB., supra, and 
is incorporated herein by reference. 
Whether the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly and 
adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a question of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 
22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,923 P.2d 
966,971 (1996). 
C. Rammell Has Failed To Show That The Trial Court Erred By Refusing His 
"Mistake Of Fact" Instruction 
Refusal of a defendant's requested instructions dealing with the defense 
theory is not error where the proposed statement is an erroneous statement of 
the law. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 855, 26 P.3d 31, 38 (2001); State v. 
Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532,817 P.2d 646 (1991); State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 
736 P.2d 1327 (1987). As set forth in Section I.C., supra, "mistake of fact" is not 
a defense to general intent crimes. State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405, 406, 788 
P.2d 220, 221 (1990); State v. Simpson, 137 Idaho 813,816-17,54 P.3d 456, 
459-60 (Ct. App. 2002). Because, for the reasons set forth in Section I.C., 
supra, possession of unlawfully taken game in violation of I.C. § 36-502(b) is a 
general intent crime, any instruction regarding "mistake of fact" would have been 
an erroneous statement of the law. Therefore, the requested instruction was 
properly refused by the trial court. 
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In addition to being an improper statement of law, Rammell's requested 
"mistake of fact" instruction was not supported by the evidence. Rammell 
requested that the court instruct the jury, consistent with I.C. § 18-201, that 
persons who committed the act or made the omission charged through 
ignorance or mistake of fact, without being conscious thereof, or through 
misfortune or by accident are exempt from criminal liability. (See R., Vol. 1, 
pp.129-30.) The "mistake of fact" defense was not available to Rammell, 
however, because the evidence Rammell proffered in support of his requested 
instruction did not establish mistake of fact or misfortune or accident, but only 
Rammell's ignorance of the law. 
Rammell has always acknowledged that he possessed an elk that he shot 
and killed in the Tex Creek Zone while having a Middle Fork tag. He also 
acknowledges that his Middle Fork tag was invalid in the Tex Creek Zone. His 
claim of entitlement to a "mistake of fact" instruction rests entirely on his 
assertion that he was misled by the 2010 Big Game Rules into believing that his 
Middle Fork tag was valid in more than one elk management zone. In other 
words, Rammell claims only to have lacked the knowledge that the taking of an 
elk in the Tex Creek Zone with a Middle Fork tag was illegal. Rammell's defense 
is thus actually a defense of ignorance of the law, not a "mistake of fact" defense 
contemplated by I.C. § 18-201. Unfortunately for Rammell, ignorance or mistake 
of law, even in good faith, is not a defense. State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 
866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993); State v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352, 355, 145 P.3d 917, 
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920 (Ct. App. 2006); Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874,880,993 P.2d 1205,1211 
(Ct. App. 2000). 
In Fox, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to that 
made by Rammell in this case. Fox was charged with possession of ephedrine. 
Fox, 124 Idaho at 925, 866 P .2d at 182. At trial, he attempted to present 
evidence showing that "he did not know or reasonably could not have known that 
ephedrine was a controlled substance." ~ at 926, 866 P.2d at 183. The district 
court sustained the state's objection to the evidence, ruling that it was "not 
relevant because knowledge that possession of ephedrine was illegal was not an 
element of the offense." ~ at 925, 866 P.2d at 182. The Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that because possession of a controlled substance "only 
requires a general intent, that is, the knowledge that one is in possession of the 
substance. . .. any evidence tending to establish Fox's lack of knowledge that 
ephedrine was illegal is irrelevant." ~ at 926,866 P.2d at 183. The court also 
rejected Fox's argument that a good faith mistake of law excused his possession 
of ephedrine, explaining: 
Ignorance of the law is not a defense. See e.g., Hale v. 
Morgan, 22 Cal.3d 388,149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 380, 584 P.2d 512, 517 
(1978) ("[I]n the absence of specific language to the contrary, 
ignorance of a law is not a defense to a charge of its violation."); 
State v. Einhorn, 213 Kan. 271, 515 P.2d 1036, 1039 (1973) ("the 
general rule is that ignorance of the law does not disprove criminal 
intent.") There is no indication in the record, nor is any argument 
made, that the defendant could not have discovered what 
substances were listed in the schedules of controlled substances. 
Ephedrine had in fact been added to the list in 1988, several years 
prior to Fox's possession of the substance in 1991. 
This is simply a case where Fox possessed a substance, 
knowing full well what the substance was, but claiming now that he 
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did not know it was listed in the statutes as a controlled substance. 
There is nothing in that argument which would rise to the level of a 
viable defense. 
Fox, 124 Idaho at 926,866 P.2d at 183. See also Dolsby, 143 Idaho at 355, 145 
P.3d at 920 (defendant's belief that muzzle loader was not legally considered a 
firearm constituted only ignorance of the law and was not a valid defense to 
crime of unlawfully possessing a firearm). 
As in Fox, there is no indication in the record that Rammell could not have 
discovered that the elk he possessed was unlawfully taken. Although Rammel! 
claimed that he was misled by the 2010 Big Game Rules as to the legality of 
taking an elk in a zone other than that specified on his tag, he does not dispute, 
nor can he, that the tag he possessed was, in actuality, only valid only in the 
Middle Fork Zone, not the Tex Creek Zone where he took the elk. See IDAPA 
13.01.08.255.01. Moreover, a review of the 2010 Big Game Rules, and the tag 
itself, actually belies Rammell's claimed lack of notice as to the requirements of 
the law. 
The 2010 Big Game Rules brochure is organized in sections according to 
species. On the second page of the section entitled "Elk" (page 29 of the 
brochure), the first paragraph states: "Elk hunting in Idaho is managed in 29 elk 
zones. In addition, Fish and Game has established a 2-tag system as an effort 
to offer elk hunters the most general season choices. Hunters may select 1 
zone and choose either an "A tag" or a "8 tag" in most elk zones." 
(Defendant's Exhibit A, p.29 (emphasis added).) Page 28 of the brochure is a 
detailed map of Idaho's 29 elk management zones, and pages 30-39 contain a 
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chart listing each of the 29 zones, the units the make up the zones, and the rules 
for hunting in each zone. (Defendant's Exhibit A, pp.28, 30-39.) The brochure 
further specifies that, if a hunter wishes to hunt for elk in a zone other than that 
for which he or she has obtained a tag, the hunter "may exchange general 
season elk tags for use in another zone" by paying a fee and accomplishing the 
exchange "before the first opening hunt date for the tag being exchanged." 
(Defendant's Exhibit A, p.77.) Construed individually or together, these 
provisions - together with Rammell's tag that specifically stated it was a "Res 
Middle Fork Elk A" tag, "Valid In Unit(s): 20A-26-27" (State's Exhibit 2) - clearly 
provided Rammell notice that his elk tag was limited to only one zone. Finally, 
page 7 of the 2010 Big Game Rules specifically provides that "[i]t is the 
responsibility of the hunter to become familiar with the rules that affect the hunt 
in which he or she is participating," that the brochure provides only "a summary 
of rules that govern big game hunting in Idaho," and that "details about the rules" 
should be obtained by referring to websites (provided) that link the hunter directly 
to applicable provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act and the 
Idaho Code. (Defendant's Exhibit A, p.7.) Clearly, Rammell had notice or, at the 
very least, could have discovered that his act of taking an elk in the Tex Creek 
Zone while possessing only a Middle Fork tag was illegal. 
Like the possession of a controlled substance statute at issue in Fox, the 
statute proscribing the possession of unlawfully taken game does not expressly 
require any mental state element and, as such, requires only a general intent -
that is, the knowledge that one is in possession of the thing proscribed. I.C. § 
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18-114; Simpson, 137 Idaho at 816-17,54 P.3d at 459-60. Rammel! concedes 
he knowingly possessed an elk taken in the Tex Creek Zone without a valid tag. 
His claim now that he did not know that it was illegal to take the elk in the Tex 
Creek Zone while having only a Middle Fork tag is simply a claim of ignorance of 
the law and does not establish a viable "mistake of fact" defense. Rammell has 
failed to show error in the denial of his requested "mistake of fact" instruction. 
D. Rammell Has Failed To Show Error In The Trial Court's Refusal To 
Instruct The JUry On the 2010 Big Game Rules 
Rammell asked the trial court to instruct the jury that "In order for an 
animal to be unlawfully taken" it must have been "taken or killed in a manner in 
violation of the regulation or laws of the State of Idaho as detailed in the 'IDAHO 
BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010' brochure." (R., Vol. 1 , p.127 (emphasis 
original).) He also requested an instruction containing the following language 
from the 2010 Big Game Rules: "Elk Hunting in Idaho is managed in 29 elk 
zones. In addition, Fish and Game has established a 2-tag system as an effort 
to offer elk hunters the most general season choices. Hunters may select 1 
zone and choose either an 'A tag' or a 'B tag' in most elk zones." (R., Vol. 1, 
pp.128-29; compare with Defendant's Exhibit A, p.29.) The trial court refused 
Rammell's proposed instructions, reasoning in a pretrial order that there is "little 
difference between the IDAPA regulations and that described in the publication. 
The IDAPA regulations being the actual regulations it is that which should be 
given to the jury." (R., Vol. 1, p.71.) Contrary to Rammell's assertions on 
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appeal, the trial court properly refused Rammell's proposed instructions because 
the rule he cited was adequately covered by other instructions given to the jury. 
Although a defendant is entitled to have his legal theory of the case 
submitted to the jury under proper instructions, the trial court does not err in 
refusing a proposed instruction where it is adequately covered by other 
instructions given by the court. State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909, 920, 88 P .3d 
728, 739 (2004). The court's instructions in this case informed the jury that (1) in 
order for Rammel! to be guilty of possessing unlawfully taken wildlife, he must 
have "Possessed wildlife, to-wit a cow elk," "which was unlawfully taken" (R., Vol. 
1, p.182); (2) to prove the animal was unlawfully taken, the state was required to 
prove that "the animal was protected under the laws of the State of Idaho," "the 
animal was taken or killed in a manner in violation of the regulation or laws of the 
State of Idaho," and "in this case the animal was taken or killed by an individual 
who did not possess a proper permit to take or kill the animal" (R., Vol. 1, p.183); 
and (3) "In order for an elk to be lawfully taken the following must be complied 
with: ... The Elk Zone A Tag is valid for specified A Tag elk seasons within a 
specified zone only" (R., Vol. 1, p.184). These instructions are consistent with 
the statutes and regulations governing the taking of wildlife, see I.e. §§ 36-
409(c) and 36-502(b); IDAPA 13.01.08.255.01, and also adequately covered 
Rammell's proposed instruction that cited the zone selection language from the 
2010 Big Game Rules. 
Rammell argues that he was entitled to have his proposed jury 
instructions submitted to the jury because the 2010 Big Game Rules are the 
20 
official proclamation of the Fish and Game Commission and have full force and 
effect as law. (Appellant's brief, pp.25-29.) The state agrees that the rules set 
forth in the 2010 Big Game Rules brochure carry the weight of the law. I.C. § 36-
105(2) and (3). Contrary to Rammell's assertions, however, that does not mean 
that the rules were not adequately covered by the court's other instructions. The 
2010 Big Game Rules brochure expressly states that it is merely a "summary of 
rules that govern big game hunting in Idaho." (Defendant's Exhibit A, p.7 
(emphasis added).) The actual laws and regulations upon which that summary 
is based are contained in Title 36 of the Idaho Code and Section 13.01.08 of the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA). (See id.) As found by the 
magistrate, the 2010 Big Game Rules do not substantively differ from the actual 
statutes and regulations; both require the hunter to limit his or her elk hunting 
activities to the zone specified on his or her elk tag. Compare I.C. § 36-409 and 
IDAPA 13.01.08.255.01-.02 with Defendant's Exhibit A, pp.28-40, 77; see also 
Section II.C, supra (discussing notice provided by 2010 Big Game Rules). 
Because there is no substantive difference between the 2010 Big Game Rules 
and the Idaho statutes and regulations that govern the hunting of big game in 
Idaho, and because the trial court instructed the jury on the relevant statutes and 
regulations, the trial court did not err by declining Rammell's proposed 
instructions based on the 2010 Big Game Rules that would only have been 
duplicative of the court's instructions. Rammel! has failed to show error. 
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III. 
Rammell Has Failed To Show That The Trial Court Lacked Either Subject Matter 
Or Personal Jurisdiction 
A. Introduction 
Rammell moved to dismiss the complaint charging him with possessing 
unlawfully taken game, claiming the trial court lacked both personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction. (R, Vol. 1, pp.101-07.) The magistrate denied Rammell's 
motion and the district court affirmed, ruling that Rammell's jurisdictional claims 
were without merit. (R, Vol. 1, pp.117-18; R, Vol. 2, pp.255-56.) On appeal, 
Rammell reasserts the arguments he advanced to the magistrate and district 
courts (compare R, Vol. 1, pp.101-07 and R., Vol. 2, pp.201-03 with Appellant's 
brief, pp.29-31). but he has failed to carry his appellate burden of showing error 
in the lower courts' rulings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review applicable to review of a decision rendered by a 
district court in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section I.B., 
supra, and is incorporated herein by reference. Whether a court has jurisdiction 
is a question of law, given free review. State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 
80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003). 
C. Rammell's Jurisdictional Arguments Are Without Merit 
Before a defendant can be held to answer in a criminal case, the court in 
which the proceeding is commenced must have both personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 
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(2004). Personal jurisdiction refers, generally, "to the court's authority to 
adjudicate the claim as to the person." kL at 227, 91 P.3d at 1131 (quoting 
Matter of Hanson, 121 Idaho 507, 509, 826 P.2d 468, 470 (1992». Subject 
matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to the court's authority to adjudicate 
the case. kL 
As he did below, Rammell claims that the magistrate lacked personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the prosecution against him because the 
Complaint identified him as "Rex F. Rammell" instead of "Rex Floyd Rammell." 
(Appellant's brief, pp.29-31.) According to Rammell, "Rex F. Rammell" is "a false 
designation of an individual who does not exist as a person in the state of Idaho" 
and, as such, "the real party of interest, Rex Floyd Rammell is not answerable to 
the charges against such other individual." (Appellant's brief, pp.30-31.) 
Rammell has cited no authority, and the state is aware of any, that stands for the 
proposition that an individual can defeat a court's jurisdiction merely because the 
charging document identifies the individual using his middle initial instead of his 
full middle name,4 nor can he; correct application of the law to the facts shows 
that the magistrate had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the criminal case in which Rammell personally appeared. 
"In a criminal case, the court properly acquires personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant when the defendant appears at the initial court setting on a 
complaint or arraignment on the indictment." Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d 
4 Notably, while Rammell claims that "Rex F. Rammell" is a "person who does 
not exist" (Appellant's brief, p.31), Rammell actually identifies himself as "Rex F. 
Rammell ... Pro se for Appellant' on the cover of his Appellant's brief. 
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at 1132 (citing I.C.R. 4,10; State v. Cronin, 923 P.2d 694,697 (Wash. 1996)); 
see also State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) ("Idaho 
courts obtain personal jurisdiction over a criminal defendant when the defendant 
initially appears in court."). In this case, the magistrate acquired personal 
jurisdiction over Rammell when he appeared and was arraigned on the complaint 
charging him with possessing unlawfully taken game, in violation of I.C. § 36-
502(b). (See R., Vol. 1, pp.11-12 (complaint), 13 (minutes of arraignment at 
which Rammell appeared).) It does not matter that Rammell subsequently 
objected to the court's jurisdiction over him. "Idaho Code § 18-202 establishes 
the court's personal jurisdiction over all individuals who commit a crime in this 
state." Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 1132 (emphasis added). The mere 
unwillingness of a criminal defendant to assent to the court's authority does not 
defeat the court's lawful exercise of personal jurisdiction once the defendant 
personally appears in court. See State v. Simmons, 115 Idaho 877, 878, 771 
P.2d 541, 542 (Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted) (rejecting defendant's claim 
that personal jurisdiction could not exist without a contract or his agreement 
thereto, stating, "[w]e have consistently and unequivocally rejected the notion 
that a state must contract with a citizen either to obtain personal jurisdiction or to 
subject the citizen to its laws"). 
The magistrate also had subject matter jurisdiction. "Subject matter 
jurisdiction in a criminal case is conferred by the filing of an 'information, 
indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the State of 
Idaho.'" Jones, 140 Idaho at 757-58, 101 P.3d at 701-02 (citing Rogers, 140 
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Idaho at 227, 91 P.3d at 1131}. In this case, the state filed a criminal complaint, 
citing I.C. § 36-502, and alleging that Rammell, "in the County of Bonneville, 
State of Idaho, possessed wildlife or parts thereof (a cow elk) protected by the 
provisions of Title 36, Idaho Code and the taking or killing of which was unlawful 
because defendant did not possess the appropriate tag." (R.,vol. 1, pp.11-12, 
57-58.) Because the charging document alleged an offense committed in the 
State of Idaho, it conferred on the magistrate subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
and determine the case. Jones, 140 Idaho at 757-58, 101 P.3d at 701-02; 
Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 1132. Rammell's arguments to the 
contrary are without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
intermediate appellate decision that affirmed Rammell's conviction for 
possessing unlawfully taken game. 
DATED this 15th day of October 2012. 
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